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Abstract
In this paper we analyze equilibrium determinacy in a sticky price
model in which the pass-through from policy rates to retail interest
rates is sluggish and potentially incomplete. In addition, we empiri-
cally characterize and compare the interest rate pass-through process
in the euro area and the U.S. We ﬁnd that if the pass-through is in-
complete in the long run, the standard Taylor principle is insuﬃcient
to guarantee equilibrium determinacy. Our empirical analysis indi-
cates that this result might be particularly relevant for bank-based
ﬁnancial systems as for instance that in the euro area.
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11 Introduction
The stability properties associated with monetary policy rules have attracted
a substantial amount of attention. In particular, monetary policy rules give
rise to a determinate equilibrium if the implied response to inﬂation is suf-
ﬁciently strong. To avoid indeterminacy, nominal interest rates have to re-
spond suﬃciently to an increase in inﬂation to raise the real interest rate.
Hence, the nominal rate has to respond at least one-for-one to changes in the
(expected) inﬂation rate to guarantee a unique and stable equilibrium. This
result is referred to as the Taylor principle (Woodford, 2003). Otherwise,
the equilibrium is indeterminate and ﬂuctuations resulting from self-fulﬁlling
revisions in expectations become possible. Intuitively, if nominal rates do not
adjust suﬃciently, a rise in expected inﬂation leads to a decrease in the real
interest rate, which stimulates aggregate demand. Higher aggregate demand
results in an increase in inﬂation, and consequently the initial expectation is
conﬁrmed. Several studies argue that the comparatively successful conduct
of monetary policy since the early 1980s is primarily due to the implemen-
tation of an appropriate policy rule, that is, a rule that satisﬁes the Taylor
principle (see e.g. Judd and Rudebush, 1998; Taylor, 1999; Clarida et al.,
1998, 2000).1
Empirically it appears that retail interest rates respond less than one-for-
one to policy rates (e.g. De Bondt, 2005; Ehrmann et al., 2003). Moreover,
retail rates are likely to inﬂuence aggregate demand at least to some extent.
Thus, it seems conceivable that although monetary policy is tightened suf-
ﬁciently, obeying the Taylor principle, retail interest rates do not respond
1Nevertheless, this view is not without controversy. In a series of papers, Orphanides
(2005, 2003, 2002) argues that the instability observed in the 1970s was the consequence
of too ambitions goals for output stabilization and too pessimistic real-time estimates of
the output gap.
2suﬃciently to ensure that real rates are stabilizing. This appears to be par-
ticularly relevant for the euro area, which is generally thought to be an ex-
ample of a bank-based ﬁnancial system (Allen and Gale, 2000). Berger and
Udell (1992) point out that liquidity smoothing is typical for environments,
in which close customer relationships develop over time. That is, banks with
close ties to their customers may oﬀer implicit interest rate insurance and
hold interest rates relatively constant despite changes in the stance of mon-
etary policy.
In the present paper we analyze the stability properties of a simple sticky
price model in which retail interest rates adjust sluggishly to changes in
policy rates and the pass-through is potentially incomplete. In particular,
we introduce costly ﬁnancial intermediation, which gives rise to sticky retail
interest rates. Although we model limited interest rate pass-through in a
highly simpliﬁed way without providing explicit micro foundations, we still
believe that this feature of the model represents an important aspect of the
monetary transmission mechanism that is missing in most other models.
Several studies ﬁnd that the conditions for a determinate equilibrium
have to be modiﬁed under certain circumstances. Edge and Rudd (2002) and
Roisland (2003) claim that the presence of taxes on capital income requires
a strengthening of the Taylor principle. Gal´ ı et al. (2004) introduce rule-of-
thumb consumers in a sticky-price model and show that the Taylor principle
is no longer suﬃcient for determinacy. De Fiore and Liu (2005) ﬁnd that
for a small open economy the degree of openness to trade is critical for
stability. However, to our knowledge the idea that the ﬁnancial system and
in particular the interest rate pass-through may impact upon the determinacy
of the equilibrium has not been explored. Thus, the present paper contributes
to the literature in this respect.
3Our main result is that if the pass-through to retail interest rates is in-
complete in the long run, the standard Taylor principle no longer guarantees
a determinate equilibrium. Put diﬀerently, the coeﬃcient on inﬂation in the
Taylor rule may have to be well above unity to be consistent with a unique
and stable equilibrium.
In addition, we explore whether limited interest rate pass-through is likely
to be important in a quantitative sense. We provide empirical evidence on
the pass-through process for the euro area and the U.S. as examples of bank-
based and market-based systems, respectively. We ﬁnd that the pass-through
is less complete in the euro area in comparison to the U.S. Based on our
empirical results and the monetary policy reaction functions estimated in
the literature, we conclude that limited pass-through does not appear to be
a source of instability neither in the euro area nor in the U.S.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes a simple model,
which will be the basis of our analysis. The link between limited pass-through
and determinacy is analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 reports the results of our
empirical analysis and Section 5 discusses the implications of the empirical
results in terms of determinacy. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model
The model we employ is a standard New Keynesian business cycle model
closely related to Woodford (2003), hence the description will be brief. The
model consists of ﬁrms, a ﬁnancial intermediary sector and households. The
only asset available in the economy is a risk-less, nominal, one-period bond,
Bt, that pays an interest rate of Rt. However, it is assumed that households
cannot buy bonds directly, but have to deposit funds, Dt, at a ﬁnancial
intermediary instead. The ﬁnancial intermediary uses the deposits of the
4households and buys bonds. Moreover, we assume that ﬁnancial interme-
diation is costly and that this cost is a function of the change in interest
rates. This assumption allows us to introduce interest rate smoothing into
the model in a simple, reduced-form way. The ﬁnancial intermediaries max-
imize proﬁts, given by RtBt −ΨtRD
t Dt, by the choice of bonds and deposits,
which yield a gross interest rate of RD
t . Ψt > 1 represents an intermedia-








, where ψ0 > 0
and ψ > 0. The parameter ψ0 is chosen such that Ψt > 1. Since banks do
not have an incentive to hold reserves, it follows that Dt = Bt. Taking a












where hatted variables denote percentage deviations from the steady state.
Thus, 1/(1+ψ) determines the immediate pass-through from the bond yield,
which is assumed to be the interest rate targeted by monetary policy, and
ψν/(1 + ψ) determines the persistence of the deposit rate.


















where σ > 0 and η > 0, β is a discount factor, Ct is consumption of a
composite good in period t and Lt denotes labor supply in period t. The
composite consumption good, Ct, is a CES aggregate of the quantities of







holds enter each period with bank deposits carried over from the previous
period, Dt−1. Furthermore, households supply Lt units of labor at a nomi-
nal wage of Wt. The representative household owns ﬁrms and the ﬁnancial
intermediaries and receives dividends. Hence, deposits evolve according to:
Dt = WtLt+RD
t Dt−1−PtCt+Πt, where Pt denotes the aggregate price index
5and Πt denotes dividends distributed at the end of the period. Household
behavior is summarized by the usual consumption Euler equation and a labor
supply equation:





t − Et(ˆ πt+1)) + Et( ˆ Ct+1), (3)
ˆ Wt − ˆ Pt = ηˆ Lt + σ ˆ Ct, (4)
where πt = logPt − logPt−1 is the inﬂation rate. The business sector of
the economy consists of a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms
normalized to unit mass. Each ﬁrm i hires labor, Hit, and produces output
according to: Yit = H
1−α
it , where α ∈ (0,1). Furthermore, we assume stag-
gered price setting and allow inﬂation to depend on its own history, as in
Gal´ ı et al. (1999) and Gal´ ı et al. (2001). That is, each period, a fraction
(1−θ) of the ﬁrms is able to readjust its price. Moreover, a fraction (1−ω)
of these ﬁrms that can set prices in the current period resets prices opti-
mally, the remaining ﬁrms follow a backward looking rule. As shown in Gal´ ı
et al. (2001), these assumptions on the pricing behavior of ﬁrms give rise to
a Phillips curve of the form:
ˆ πt = δd mct + βθφ




(1+α(−1)) φ−1, φ = θ + ω(1 − θ(1 − β)) and mct denotes
average real marginal cost.
Using the market clearing conditions Yt = Ct and Ht = Lt and (4), the
log-linearized model can be written as:





t − Et(ˆ πt+1)) + Et(ˆ Yt+1), (6)
ˆ πt = δγ ˆ Yt + βθφ









1−α −1+σ, λ1 = 1/(1+ψ) and λ2 = ψνλ1. The intertemporal IS
curve in (6) and the Phillips curve in (7) constitute a baseline model widely
used for the evaluation of monetary policy (see e.g. Clarida et al., 1999).
The dynamics of the deposit rate is determined by (8) where λ1 captures the
instantaneous pass-through from policy to deposit rates and λ2 determines
the degree of persistence. To fully describe the equilibrium dynamics of the
model, an interest rate rule as a description of monetary policy is added. We
assume that monetary policy targets the interest rate on bonds, Rt:
ˆ Rt = ρ ˆ Rt−1 + (1 − ρ)(κπˆ πt + κy ˆ Yt), (9)
where ρ determines the degree of monetary policy inertia and κπ, κy charac-
terize the response of the policy rate to inﬂation and output, respectively.
3 Interest Rate Pass-Through and Determi-
nacy
In this section we analyze how the interest rate pass-through inﬂuences the
stability properties of the model. The model (6) - (9) can be conveniently
written as AEt(ut+1) = But, where ut = (ˆ Yt, ˆ πt, ˆ Rt, ˆ RD
t )0 and A and B are co-
eﬃcient matrices with entries that are functions of the structural parameters.
Determinacy or stability of the rational-expectations equilibrium corresponds
to the case where the number of eigenvalues of A−1B outside the unit circle is
equal to the number of predetermined variables (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980).
We simulate the model to see how the parameters λ1 and λ2 inﬂuence this
stability condition.
The following parameter values are chosen: The time discount factor β
is set to 0.99. The coeﬃcients σ and η, which determine the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution and the labor supply elasticity, are both set equal to
72.  is set to 11, which corresponds to a steady-state mark-up of 10 percent.
α is set to 0.33. Furthermore, ω = 0.3, which means that 30 percent of
the ﬁrms follow a backward-looking pricing rule. Prices are assumed to be
ﬁxed on average for four quarters, therefore θ = 0.75. This calibration of the
price-setting behavior is roughly in line with the recent empirical evidence
(see Leith and Malley, 2005). According to empirical evidence reported in
Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa (2004) for the euro area and in Clarida et al. (2000)
for the U.S., we set ρ = 0.8.
For simplicity, consider the case where monetary policy does not react to
the output gap, that is κy = 0. Furthermore, let λ = λ1/(1 − λ2) denote
the long-run eﬀect of the policy interest rate on the deposit rate. Figure
1 displays the frontier that divides the parameter space (λ,κπ) into regions
corresponding to determinate and indeterminate equilibria. The frontier is
downward sloping and convex to the origin. Points to the right of the frontier
correspond to parameter combinations that are consistent with a determinate
equilibrium. Points to the left lead to indeterminacy. Thus, the frontier de-
ﬁnes the lower bound on κπ, denoted by ¯ κπ, where κπ > ¯ κπ is consistent with
a determinate equilibrium. Clearly, a lower long-run pass-through requires
a stronger response of monetary policy to inﬂation to ensure determinacy.
In particular, our simulations show that for κy = 0, ¯ κπ corresponds to 1/λ.
Thus, the Taylor principle has to be modiﬁed in this environment to κπλ > 1.
For values of κπ below ¯ κπ, the equilibrium is indeterminate and ﬂuctuations
resulting from self-fulﬁlling revisions in expectations become possible. The
intuition is straightforward: For low values of λ, changes in the policy interest
rate are to a large extent absorbed by the banking sector and not passed on
to households. Hence, if expected inﬂation increases, monetary policy has to
be tightened considerably to have a stabilizing eﬀect on aggregate demand.
8Note that what matters is the long-run pass-through. Thus, high persistence,
λ2, compensates for a low initial pass-through, λ1. For λ = 1 the associated
value of ¯ κπ is unity. Hence, for a complete pass-through at least in the long
run, we obtain the standard Taylor principle.
So far we have restricted our analysis to the case κy = 0. For κy > 0, the
frontier shifts down, since the response of interest rates to the output gap
has to be taken into account. According to the Phillips curve, permanently
higher inﬂation implies a permanently higher output gap, which will lead
to higher interest rates in the long run (see Woodford, 2003). However, for
empirically plausible values for κy the implications for ¯ κπ are negligible.





















Notes: The frontier divides the parameter space (λ,κπ) into regions corresponding to
determinate and indeterminate equilibria. Points to the right of the frontier correspond
to parameter combinations that are consistent with a determinate equilibrium.
Note that according to (9) the nominal interest rate adjusts to contem-
9poraneous deviations of inﬂation and output from their steady state val-
ues, whereas empirical evidence indicates that monetary policy acts in a
forward-looking manner. In models with forward-looking interest rate rules,
the Taylor principle is still a necessary condition for equilibrium determinacy,
although it is no longer suﬃcient. In particular, if the nominal interest rate is
adjusted in response to expected inﬂation, determinacy additionally requires
that κπ is not too large (Woodford, 2003). However, the upper bound on κπ
associated with determinacy appears to be extremely large for plausible pa-
rameterizations and is satisﬁed by empirically estimated interest rate rules.
Thus, focusing our analysis on the class of non-forward-looking interest rate
rules does not appear to be overly restrictive.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section we empirically compare the interest rate pass-through across
ﬁnancial systems, where the euro area and the U.S. are taken as examples of a
bank-based and a market-based system, respectively. The empirical analysis
is based on (8) which describes the dynamics of the retail interest rate in
the model. As our model does not explicitly account for investment, we
interpret Ct more broadly as the interest-sensitive part of GDP and not just
as consumption spending. Hence, our empirical analysis is based on a wide
spectrum of retail rates relevant for households and ﬁrms. The empirical
strategy consists of the following steps: We start by testing for unit roots in
our retail and monetary policy rate series, where we take the three-month
money market rate as a proxy for the policy rate. For those series, which are
found to be integrated, we proceed with testing for cointegration between
retail and policy rates, since this would suggest to generalize our estimating
equation to an error-correction model. Finally, we use an equation similar to
10(8) to estimate the pass-through in the short and in the long run.
4.1 Data
Due to diﬀerences in the statistical systems, it is hard to ﬁnd equivalent retail
interest rate series for the U.S. and the euro area. For bank deposit rates we
aim for interest rates with similar maturities, while regarding lending rates
we take loans that cover businesses and consumers over short as well as long
horizons. For the U.S. we analyze four diﬀerent bank deposit rates with ma-
turities between one month and one year. For the euro area we include ﬁve
diﬀerent deposit rates: sight deposits, saving deposits (redeemable at notice
below and above three months) and time deposits (with agreed maturities
below and above two years). Moreover, we incorporate three diﬀerent bank
lending rates for the U.S. in our analysis, which cover short-term loans for
businesses, short-term consumer credits as well as mortgage loans for busi-
nesses and households. For the euro area we include four diﬀerent lending
rates, namely business loans (below and above one year) and short-term loans
as well as mortgage loans to households. All interest rates are monthly data,
with the exception of consumer credit rates in the U.S., which are reported
with a quarterly frequency. The time period we consider starts in January
1995 and ends in September 2003, because no longer aggregated time series
are available for the euro area.2 There are a few exceptions where the time
series starts little later than January 1995. Details on the time period cov-
ered by the data as well as the source of the data are found in Appendix
A.
The various deposit and lending rates give an overview of the diﬀerent
2In 2003 the ECB changed the statistical system for collecting retail interest rates and
stopped producing the series mentioned above in September 2003. The new series that
starts in 2003 is not compatible with the one we are using.
11dimensions of the pass-through process. However, in order to have one repre-
sentative value for deposit as well as for lending rates, we construct weighted
averages of these interest rates. The weights are chosen according to the
importance of the individual lending and deposit categories in the portfo-
lio of commercial banks. For the U.S. we take the weights from the Flow
of Funds Accounts of the United States (Z.1), which are published by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.3 The three lending rates
mentioned above are taken as representative interest rates for the portfolio
items ‘bank loans n.e.c.’, ‘consumer credit’ and ‘mortgages’, which altogether
amount to 95 percent of total loans of the commercial banking sector.4 Time
and saving deposits are also included in the Flow of Funds Accounts, how-
ever, unfortunately not according to their maturities. Thus, we are not able
to set up a weighted average for U.S. bank deposit rates. For weighting retail
rates in the euro area we can directly refer to balance sheet information from
Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI), which are published in the statistical
section of the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin.5
4.2 Unit Root and Cointegration Tests
We ﬁrst test for unit roots in money market and retail interest rates in
our sample using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (see Dickey and
Fuller, 1979; Said and Dickey, 1984) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test (see
3Table L.109 gives the levels of the portfolio of U.S. commercial banks.
4In 2003 ‘bank loans n.e.c.’ constitute 29 percent, ‘consumer credit’ 15 percent and
‘mortgages’ 51 percent of total loans from commercial banks.
5Table 2.4 of the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin gives the amount of loans from monetary
ﬁnancial institutions according to counterpart, type and maturity. In 2003 the shares
of business loans, short-term loans to consumers and mortgage loans to consumers were
52 percent, 8 percent and 40 percent, respectively. Table 2.5 of the ECB’s Monthly
Bulletin gives the amount of deposits held with MFIs by counterpart and instrument.
Sight deposits, saving deposits and time deposits amounted to 38 percent, 31 percent and
31 percent of total deposits held by non-ﬁnancial corporations and households in the euro
area, respectively.
12Phillips, 1987; Phillips and Perron, 1988). Ng and Perron (2001) argue that
many unit root tests suﬀer from low power and size distortions. Thus, we
also apply the four tests developed by Ng and Perron (2001) (NgP tests)
with improved size and power.6
Detailed test results are reported in Appendix B. In all but one case the
results of the ADF test and the PP test suggest that the series are I(1) and
these results are conﬁrmed by the four NgP tests. The one exception is the
interest rate on sight deposits in the euro area, where the PP test argues in
favor of I(1), while the ADF test and the four NgP tests indicate that the
time series is I(2). Hence, we follow the majority of the tests and take this
series to be I(2).
As money market rates and retail interest rates are I(1), with the excep-
tion of the interest rate on sight deposits in the euro area, we proceed with
testing for cointegration between market and retail rates. The series for the
interest rates on sight deposits in the euro area is excluded from this analysis.
Again we apply a battery of tests. First, we apply the OLS-residual-based
tests proposed by Engle and Granger (1987) (ADF test) and Phillips and
Ouliaris (1990) (PP test). In addition, we use the more recent tests devel-
oped by Perron and Rodriguez (2001) (PR test), who use GLS-detrended
data and construct test statistics similar to those by Ng and Perron (2001).
In particular, we apply two of the PR tests, which are modiﬁed forms of the
PP test statistics (MZa) and the ADF test (ADF-GLS).
For the U.S. the standard tests (ADF test and PP test) suggest that all
retail interest rates (lending as well as deposit rates) are cointegrated (at
least at the 10 percent level), while the PR tests reject the hypothesis of
6These test statistics from Ng and Perron (2001) are modiﬁed forms of the PP test
statistics (MZa, MZt), the test statistic suggested by Bhargava (1986) (MSB), and the
Point Optimal statistic from Elliot et al. (1996)(MPT).
13cointegration. For the euro area the standard tests do not give a uniform
answer for all the series. While long-term lending rates are more likely to be
cointegrated, short-term lending rates and deposit rates do not seem to have
a cointegrating relationship with money market rates. However, as in the
case of U.S. retail rates, the new PR tests clearly argue against cointegration
for all series. Detailed test results can be found in Appendix B.
As the tests suggested by Perron and Rodriguez (2001) achieve important
power gains through the use of GLS-detrended data, we conclude that none
of the retail rates is cointegrated with the money market rate.
4.3 Long-Run Pass-Through
We estimate the pass-through in the short and in the long run based on
(8). To take the non-stationarity of the data into account, the equation
is estimated with diﬀerenced data. Since our data series do not appear to
be cointegrated we do not include an error-correction term. However, the
equation is generalized to an autoregressive distributed-lag (ADL) model by
adding additional lags of the money market rate and the retail interest rate.
We choose the number of lags according to the Akaike Information Criterion
with the maximum number of lags set at six.
∆R
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where n and m denote the number of lags chosen as described above.
Tables 1 and 2 give the results for the U.S. and the euro area, respectively.
As shown in the upper block of Table 1, in the U.S. the long-term pass-
14through of money market rates to bank deposit rates is nearly complete. For
deposits with short maturities (one and three months) the null hypothesis
that the long-run pass-through is equal to one is not rejected. For deposit
rates with maturities of six months and one year the long-run pass-through
appears to be slightly below unity. Changes in money market rates are passed
on quickly. In some cases in the short run even to a larger extent than in the
long run.
In the lower block of Table 1 we see that for U.S. lending rates the picture
is less clear: On the one hand, mortgage rates in the U.S. are smoothed
heavily. In the long run only 29 basis points are passed on from a 100 basis
point change in the money market rate. On the other hand, in the case of
short-term business loans the long-run pass-through is complete. Statistically
it is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one. Also, the extent of how much is
passed on immediately diﬀers substantially between the various lending rates.
Furthermore, the weighted average of the long-run pass-through to lending
rates in the U.S. amounts to 0.57. Put diﬀerently, in the long run slightly
below 60 percent of a change in short-term market rates are passed on to U.S.
borrowers, while the remaining fraction is absorbed by the banking sector.
The upper block of Table 2 gives the results for deposit rates in the euro
area. There we observe a much smaller pass-through to deposit rates than in
the U.S. The long-run pass-through ranges between 0.27 for saving deposits
with a maturity of less than three months and 0.66 for time deposits with
a maturity of up to two years. Our estimates of the ﬁnal pass-through are
smaller for all categories than those reported in De Bondt (2005).7 However,
the relative size of the long-run pass-through to the various deposit rates is
the same in both analyses. The immediate pass-through is quite heteroge-
7De Bondt (2005) uses diﬀerent data and a shorter time period and assumes that nearly
all series are cointegrated.




TCD, 1 month 0.76 (0.06) 1.04 (0.03)
TCD, 3 months 1.02 (0.01) 1.01 (0.01)
TCD, 6 months 1.03 (0.05) 0.92 (0.04)
US deposits, 1 year 1.08 (0.09) 0.74 (0.08)
Lending rates
Business, short-term 0.44 (0.06) 1.04 (0.05)
Mortgage, long-term 0.71 (0.16) 0.29 (0.28)
Consumers, short-term 0.30 (0.12) 0.36 (0.08)
Weighted average 0.79 (0.15) 0.57 (0.11)
Notes: TCD abbreviates Time Certiﬁcates of Deposit. Standard errors in parentheses.
The standard errors for the long-term pass-through are calculated according to the delta
method (e.g. Greene, 2000, p. 330). The sample of mortgage lending rates in the U.S. was
shortened to 2000, where there seems to be a structural break. After 2000 the short- as
well as the long-run pass-through decline signiﬁcantly. Because of the structural break in
the mortgage rate, the sample of the weighted average was also adjusted to 1995-2000.
neous in the euro area. For deposit rates with short maturities, a third to
half of the amount passed on in the long run is passed on within one month.
For deposit rates with longer maturities, the short-run and the long-run pass-
through are roughly equal. On average the long-run pass-through to deposit
rates in the euro area amounts to 0.32.
From the lower block of Table 2 we see the results for lending rates in the
euro area. There the long-run pass-through ranges between 0.43 for short-
term loans to households and 0.69 for business loans with a maturity of up
to one year. Like in the case of deposit rates, our estimates of the long-run
pass-through to lending rates are smaller than those in De Bondt (2005).
The weighted average of lending rates, which summarizes short-term and
long-term loans to businesses and households in the euro area, lies at 0.48.
Hence, in the euro area approximately 50 percent of a money market rate




Saving deposits, < 3 months 0.09 (0.02) 0.27 (0.04)
Saving deposits, > 3 months 0.32 (0.04) 0.60 (0.08)
TD, up to 2 years 0.36 (0.04) 0.66 (0.08)
TD, over 2 years 0.40 (0.06) 0.41 (0.10)
Weighted average 0.16 (0.02) 0.32 (0.03)
Lending rates
Business, up to 1 year 0.27 (0.04) 0.69 (0.15)
Business, over 1 year 0.47 (0.07) 0.55 (0.08)
Mortgage, households 0.35 (0.06) 0.53 (0.09)
Households, short-term 0.09 (0.05) 0.43 (0.09)
Weighted average 0.34 (0.05) 0.48 (0.06)
Notes: TD abbreviates Time Deposits. Standard errors in parentheses. The standard
errors for the long-term pass-through are calculated according to the delta method (see
e.g. Greene, 2000, p. 330).
change are on average passed on to borrowers, while 50 percent are absorbed
by the banking sector.
From this we conclude that the long-run pass-through is more complete in
the U.S. than in the euro area. While the pass-through from money market
rates to bank deposit rates is nearly complete in the U.S., it amounts on
average to 0.32 in the euro area. Moreover, the comparison between the
weighted averages of the lending rates in the two economies also suggests
that the long-run pass-through to lending rates is smaller in the euro area
(0.48) than in the U.S. (0.57). However, this diﬀerence is not statistically
signiﬁcant.
175 Discussion
Ultimately, the goal of this paper is to analyze how the pass-through process
to retail interest rates inﬂuences equilibrium determinacy and macroeconomic
stability. However, a precise quantitative evaluation appears diﬃcult for the
following reason: It is not clear to what extent retail interest rates as opposed
to market interest rates (e.g. bond yields) are relevant for the determination
of aggregate demand. Only a fraction of the households and ﬁrms in the
economy relies on ﬁnancial intermediaries, whereas the rest participates in
ﬁnancial markets directly. If the limited pass-through to retail rates is indeed
due to the formation of relationships and implicit contracts, it follows that
market rates in general should follow policy rates more closely. Assuming
that at least the long-run pass-through from policy rates to market rates is
close to complete, the overall pass-through to interest rates more generally
is likely to be higher than to retail rates.
For the U.S., the long-run pass-through, λ, is nearly complete for most
categories of deposit rates and on average approximately 0.57 for lending
rates. Thus, our empirical results suggest that ¯ κπ, the lower bound for κπ,
consistent with a determinate equilibrium, lies between unity and 1.75 in
the U.S.8 However, the banking sector and therefore retail rates play only
a relatively minor role for the determination of U.S. aggregate demand (see
e.g. Allen and Gale, 2000; De Fiore and Uhlig, 2005). Thus, we may conclude
that ¯ κπ is likely to lie substantially closer to the lower bound of this interval.
In the euro area, the average long-run pass-through appears to be lower
than in the U.S. Consequently, larger values of κπ are needed for determinacy.
Our estimate of the average pass-through to lending rates suggests a value
8Note that this calculation assumes κy = 0. For empirically plausible values of κy,
diﬀerences are negligible.
18for ¯ κπ of approximately two. Looking at the average pass-through to deposit
rates suggests an even larger value of around three. Again, the overall pass-
through to interest rates relevant for aggregate demand and macroeconomic
stability is likely to be higher. Therefore, these numbers for ¯ κπ should be
interpreted as upper bounds. However, in a bank-based system like the
the one in the euro area, the diﬀerence should not be as large as in the U.S.
Overall, the higher pass-through to U.S. retail rates together with the smaller
relative size of the U.S. banking sector suggest that ¯ κπ is lower in the U.S.
than in the euro area.
How do our results compare to empirically estimated interest rate rule
coeﬃcients? For the U.S., Clarida et al. (2000) ﬁnd a value of 2.15 for κπ for
the Volcker-Greenspan period. Based on real-time-data Orphanides (2005)
reports lower values of around 1.8. For the euro area, Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa
(2004) estimate several speciﬁcations. Based on their preferred speciﬁcation
they obtain estimates ranging from 1.9 to 2.2. A precise evaluation is again
complicated and the caveats mentioned above have to be kept in mind. How-
ever, the estimated values for κπ appear to fall within the determinate region
for both economies. Nevertheless the euro area, with its more bank-based
system, may be closer to the indeterminate region than the U.S.
6 Concluding Remarks
The inﬂuence of monetary policy on aggregate demand and inﬂation depends
on the degree to which changes in policy interest rates are ‘passed through’ to
market and retail interest rates. In this paper we focus on the possibility of
sunspot ﬂuctuations that arise from self-fulﬁlling revisions to expectations. If
the pass-through from policy to retail interest rates is incomplete in the long
run, the standard Taylor principle turns out to be insuﬃcient for equilibrium
19determinacy. Our empirical estimates indicate that this result is particularly
relevant for bank-based ﬁnancial systems like that in the euro area.
Nevertheless, our quantitative results have to be interpreted with some
caution, since it is not clear to what extent aggregate demand is sensitive to
retail interest rates as opposed to market interest rates. Despite this caveat,
we interpret our results as casting some doubt on the usual interpretation of
interest rule coeﬃcients and their implications for macroeconomic stability.
20A Data Description
Table A1: Money Market and Retail Interest Rates
Source Codes Time Period
U.S.
Deposit rates
TCD, 1 month BIS HPEAUS12 1995:01 - 2003:09
TCD, 3 months BIS HPEAUS02 1995:01 - 2003:09
TCD, 6 months BIS HPEAUS62 1995:01 - 2003:09
U.S. deposits, 1 year IFS 111 60LDF 1995:01 - 2003:09
Lending rates
Business, short-term BIS HLBAUS02 1995:01 - 2003:09
Mortgage, long-term BIS HLLAUS01 1995:01 - 2003:09
Consumers, short-term Fed G.19 1995:01 - 2003:09
Weighted average 1995:01 - 2003:09
Money market rate
Money market, 3 months BIS JFBAUS02 1995:01 - 2003:09
Euro area
Deposit rates
Sight deposits BIS HPBAXM02 1995:12 - 2003:09
Saving deposits, < 3 months BIS HPHAXM16 1995:01 - 2003:09
Saving deposits, > 3 months BIS HPHAXM36 1995:01 - 2003:09
TD, up to 2 years BIS HPFAXM16 1995:12 - 2003:09
TD, over 2 years BIS HPFAXM26 1995:12 - 2003:09
Weighted average 1995:12 - 2003:09
Lending rates
Business, up to 1 year BIS HLBAXM12 1995:12 - 2003:09
Business, over 1 year BIS HLHAXM02 1996:11 - 2003:09
Mortgage, households BIS HLMAXM22 1995:12 - 2003:09
Households, short-term BIS HLBAXM22 1995:12 - 2003:09
Weighted average 1996:11 - 2003:09
Money market rate
Money market, 3 months BIS JFBAXM02 1995:01 - 2003:09
Notes: TCD abbreviates Time Certiﬁcates of Deposit and TD Time Deposits. BIS stands
for the Data Bank of the Bank for International Settlements. IFS stands for the Inter-
national Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund and Fed stands for the
monthly statistical release of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System of the
U.S.
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